This book examines in detail Ludwig Wittgenstein's ideas on thought, thinking, will and intention, as those ideas developed over his lifetime. It also puts his ideas into context by a comparison both with preceding thinkers and with subsequent ones. The first chapter gives an account of the historical and philosophical background, discussing such thinkers as Plato, Descartes, Berkeley, Frege and Russell. The final chapter looks at the legacy of, and reactions to, Wittgenstein. These two chapters frame the central three chapters, devoted to Wittgenstein's ideas on thought and will. Chapter 2 discusses the sense in which both thought and will represent, or are about, reality; Chapter 3 considers Wittgenstein's critique of the picture of an inner process, and the role that behaviour and context play in his views on thought and will; while Chapter 4 centres on the question What sort of thing is it that thinks or wills?, in particular examining Wittgenstein's ideas concerning the first person (I) and concerning statements like I am thinking or I intend to do X.

This book examines in detail Ludwig Wittgenstein's ideas on thought, thinking, will and intention, as those ideas developed over his lifetime. It also puts his ideas into context by a comparison both with preceding thinkers and with subsequent ones. The first chapter gives an account of the historical and philosophical background, discussing such thinkers as Plato, Descartes, Berkeley, Frege and Russell. The final chapter looks at the legacy of, and reactions to, Wittgenstein. These two chapters frame the central three chapters, devoted to Wittgenstein's ideas on thought and will. Chapter 2 discusses the sense in which both thought and will represent, or are about, reality; Chapter 3 considers Wittgenstein's critique of the picture of an inner process, and the role that behaviour and context play in his views on thought and will; while Chapter 4 centres on the question What sort of thing is it that thinks or wills?, in particular examining Wittgenstein's ideas concerning the first person (I) and concerning statements like I am thinking or I intend to do X.

Elizabeth Anscombe is among the most distinguished and original philosophers alive today. Her work has ranged over many areas of philosophy, including metaphysics, ethics, the philosophy of mind and action, and the philosophy of religion. In each of these areas she has made seminal contributions. The essays in this book reflect the breadth of her interests and the esteem in which she is held by her colleagues.

Elizabeth Anscombe's 1958 essay 'Modern Moral Philosophy' contributed to the transformation of the subject from the late 1960s, reversing the trend to assume that there is no intrinsic connection between facts, values, and reasons for action; and directing attention towards the category of virtues. Her later ethical writings were focused on particular ideas and issues such as those of conscience, double-effect, murder, and sexual ethics. In this collection of new essays deriving from a conference held in Oxford these and other aspects of her moral philosophy are examined. Anyone interested in Anscombe's work all want to read this volume.

Elizabeth Anscombe is now recognised as one of the most important philosophers of the second half of the 20th century. She left a large corpus of work, wide-ranging in content, always original and bold. Her monograph Intention, published in 1957, is a modern classic, and was described by Donald Davidson as "the most important treatment of action since Aristotle." Her writings in ethics have inspired countless discussions, and she has been credited with having changed the face of Anglophone moral philosophy by reviving and arguing for virtue ethics, now a major field. Since Anscombe's death in 2001, her philosophical work has received a steadily increasing level of attention worldwide. Anscombe is often difficult to read, and she has certainly been frequently misunderstood, but the sympathetic interest in her work which is now evident in so many quarters is making it possible for a true picture to begin to emerge of the range, depth, and power of her contribution to philosophy. The Oxford Handbook of Elizabeth Anscombe conveys something of that emerging picture of Anscombe's overall philosophy-showing the great fecundity of her ideas in essays that develop and expand on those ideas-and allows contributors to engage critically with Anscombe, not merely to expound what she said. The handbook opens with an introduction that addresses the question of the unity in diversity of Anscombe's philosophy, relating this to the twenty-two essays that follow. The handbook is divided into parts along broadly thematic lines, addressing: intention, ethical theory, human life, the first person, and Anscombe on other philosophers.

One of the most important philosophers of recent times, Elizabeth Anscombe wrote books and articles on a wide range of topics, including the ground-breaking monograph Intention. Her work is original, challenging, often difficult, always insightful; but it has frequently been misunderstood, and its overall significance is still not fully appreciated. This book is the first major study of Anscombe's philosophical oeuvre. In it, Roger Teichmann presents Anscombe's main ideas, bringing out their interconnections, elaborating and discussing their implications, pointing out objections and difficulties, and aiming to give a unified overview of her philosophy. Many of Anscombe's arguments are relevant to contemporary debates, as Teichmann shows, and on a number of topics what Anscombe has to say constitutes a powerful alternative to dominant or popular views. Among the writings discussed are Intention, 'Practical Inference', 'Modern Moral Philosophy', 'Rules, Rights and Promises', 'On Brute Facts', 'The First Person', 'The Intentionality of Sensation', 'Causality and Determination', An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, 'The Question of Linguistic Idealism', and a number of other pieces, including some that are little known or hard to obtain. A complete bibliography of Anscombe's writings is also included. Ranging from the philosophy of action, through ethics, to philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and the philosophy of logic and language, this book is a study of one of the most significant bodies of work in modern philosophy, spanning more than fifty years, and as pertinent today as ever.

At the centre of our ethical thought stands the human being. Facts about human nature determine the shape of ethical concepts in a variety of ways, and our pre-rational animal nature forms the basis of notions to do with rationality, virtue, and happiness, among other things. Nature, Reason, and the Good Life examines these themes while also arguing for the critical importance of language: only by attending to the social and empirical character of actual language use can we make headway with a number of problems in ethics. Thus what counts as a good or bad reason for action depends on the purposes of human enquiry, as embodied in the question "Why?"--it does not depend, for example, on some abstract and higher Rationality connected with 'the point of the cosmos'. Furthermore, considerations in philosophy of language and in philosophy of mind together show how emotions, desires, and pleasure--all crucial for ethics--turn out not to be inner states carrying a sort of subjective authority, above or below criticism or justification, and this fact helps undermine various forms of subjectivism and individualism to be found both in philosophy and in the wider culture. Starting from an examination of foundational issues, the book covers a range of topics, including animals, agency, enjoyment, the good life, contemplation, death, and the importance of philosophy. En route, there are critiques of a number of prevalent trends of thought, such as utilitarianism, anti-speciesism, relativism, scientism and even "ism"-ism.

Elizabeth Anscombe (1919-2001) was one of the most important philosophers of the second half of the twentieth century, making major contributions in philosophy of mind, ethics, and metaphysics. She is particularly renowned for her work on intention and action. A pupil and friend of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Anscombe showed a deep understanding of his aims and methods, while being a bold and original thinker in her own right. Anscombe published two monographs and numerous articles in her lifetime, and left a considerable Nachlass. The monograph Intention (1957) has been hugely influential and has generated much discussion, as have such articles as 'Modern Moral Philosophy' and 'The First Person'. (Indeed, 'Modern Moral Philosophy' has been credited with inspiring that renewal of interest in virtues and character which came to be embodied in a whole school of thought, often called 'Virtue Theory'.) Profound, often difficult, sometimes provocative, her work is probably unique in modern philosophy for its combination of breadth and depth. Now, to allow researchers and advanced students to make better sense of Anscombe, her major works, and the developments it has encouraged, Routledge announces this new four-volume collection in its acclaimed Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers series. Henceforward, Anscombe scholars and students will be able easily and rapidly to locate the best and most influential critical scholarship, work that is otherwise often inaccessible or scattered throughout a variety of specialist journals and books. With material gathered into one easy-to-use set, researchers and students can now spend more of their time with the key journal articles, book chapters, and other pieces, rather than on time-consuming (and sometimes fruitless) archival searches. Fully indexed and with a comprehensive introduction newly written by the expert editor, which places the collected material in its historical and intellectual context, Elizabeth Anscombe is an essential reference work and is destined to be valued as a vital research resource.

At the centre of our ethical thought stands the human being. Facts about human nature determine the shape of ethical concepts in a variety of ways, and our pre-rational animal nature forms the basis of notions to do with rationality, virtue, and happiness, among other things. Nature, Reason, and the Good Life examines these themes while also arguing for the critical importance of language: only by attending to the social and empirical character of actual language use can we make headway with a number of problems in ethics. Thus what counts as a good or bad reason for action depends on the purposes of human enquiry, as embodied in the question 'Why?' - it does not depend, for example, on some abstract and higher Rationality connected with 'the point of view of the cosmos'. Furthermore, considerations in philosophy of language and in philosophy of mind together show how emotions, desires, and pleasure - all crucial for ethics - turn out not to be inner states carrying a sort of subjective authority, above or below criticism or justification, and this fact helps undermine various forms of subjectivism and individualism to be found both in philosophy and in the wider culture. Starting from an examination of foundational issues, the book covers a range of topics, including animals, agency, enjoyment, the good life, contemplation, death, and the importance of philosophy. En route, there are critiques of a number of prevalent trends of thought, such as utilitarianism, anti-speciesism, relativism, scientism and even 'ism'-ism.

One of the most important philosophers of recent times, Elizabeth Anscombe wrote books and articles on a wide range of topics, including the ground-breaking monograph Intention. Her work is original, challenging, often difficult, always insightful; but it has frequently been misunderstood, and its overall significance is still not fully appreciated. This book is the first major study of Anscombe's philosophical oeuvre. In it, Roger Teichmann presents Anscombe's main ideas, bringing out their interconnections, elaborating and discussing their implications, pointing out objections and difficulties, and aiming to give a unified overview of her philosophy. Many of Anscombe's arguments are relevant to contemporary debates, as Teichmann shows, and on a number of topics what Anscombe has to say constitutes a powerful alternative to dominant or popular views. Among the writings discussed are Intention, "Practical Inference," "Modern Moral Philosophy," "Rules, Rights and Promises," "On Brute Facts," "The First Person," "The Intentionality of Sensation," "Causality and Determination," An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, "The Question of Linguistic Idealism," and a number of other pieces, including some that are little known or hard to obtain. A complete bibliography of Anscombe's writings is also included. Ranging from the philosophy of action, through ethics, to philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and the philosophy of logic and language, this book is a study of one of the most significant bodies of work in modern philosophy, spanning more than fifty years, and as pertinent today as ever.